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ABSTRACT 
Orion is the next vehicle for human space travel. 
Humans will be sustained in space by the Orion 
subystem, environmental control and life support 
(ECLS). The ECLS concept at the subsystem level is 
outlined by function and technology. In the past two 
years, the interface definition with other subsystems has 
increased through different integrated studies. The 
paper presents the key requirements and discusses 
three recent studies (e.g., unpressurized cargo) along 
with the respective impacts on the ECLS design moving 
forward. 
INTRODUCTION 
Project Orion is a joint effort between National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
Lockheed Martin and Teammates to produce the next 
generation of human spacecraft for the United States. A  
human in that spacecraft is sustained by the 
Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) 
subsystem. The ECLS design team is Lockheed Martin, 
Hamilton Sundstrand and Paragon Space Development 
Corporation. 
In September 2006, the ECLS team began work on 
Project Orion, which is one part of NASA’s Constellation 
effort for Space Exploration. The vehicle, Orion, consists 
of four modules (see Figure 1). The CM carries the crew 
in a pressure vessel from launch through landing. The 
SM provides the CM with power, heat rejection, and 
other services from launch until CM/SM separation prior 
to reentry. ECLS is in the Crew Module (CM) and 
Service Module (SM), and the CM and SM are 
coordinated with NASA Johnson Space Center in 
Houston, Texas, and NASA Glenn Research Center in 
Cleveland, Ohio, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Orion Vehicle Breakdown by Module. 
The ECLS team works on a day to day basis with our 
NASA counterparts to understand and implement the 
requirements in the design of Orion. This paper explains 
these joint efforts by reviewing the general requirements 
and the implementation of these requirements by 
technology. In addition to the general requirements, the 
ECLS team has advanced the interface definition with 
other subsystems through different integrated studies; 
the paper concludes with a discussion of three recent 
studies (e.g., unpressurized cargo) and the respective 
impacts on the ECLS design moving forward. 
REQUIREMENTS 
Requirements come from NASA in three ways: 1) 
Constellation documents (e.g., Human system interface 
requirements), 2) Orion documents (e.g., system 
requirements document), and 3) external interface 
requirement or control documents (e.g., Lunar Surface 
Access Module (LSAM) IRD). In addition to these three 
areas, Lockheed Martin and teammates derive 
requirements for each subsystem from the spacecraft 
specification and for the internal interfaces from 
subsystem to subsystem. The requirements are 
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allocated by ECLS into the following seven functional 
categories. 
1. Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) 
2. Air Revitalization System (ARS) 
3. Fire Detection and Suppresion (FDS) 
4. Flight Suit Interface (FSI) 
5. Potable Water (PWMS) 
6. Pressure control system (PCS) 
7. Waste Management (WM) 
These seven functional categories are similar to those 
used on the International Space Station (see Table 3 of 
[1]). The specific requirements are addressed by 
functional category and technology in the companion 
paper for Orion ECLS [2]. 
For the purposes of this paper, the key requirements are 
for Orion to: 
1. Support zero to six crew for a mission to the 
International Space Station (ISS) and zero to four 
crew for a Lunar mission, 
2. Support the crew for the crewed duration of an ISS 
and a Lunar mission, 
3. Provide a nominal shirt sleeve environment for the 
crew,  
4. Operate for six months in a quiescent mode 
attached to ISS or in Low Lunar Orbit, 
5. Provide for unpressurized cargo on ISS and Lunar 
missions,  
6. Provide thermal control of avionics, batteries, and 
crew,  
7. Design for two fault tolerance, and  
8. Stay equal to or less than the mass, power, and 
volume allocations for ECLS. 
 
With support from NASA, the Constellation and Orion 
requirements were understood, and this understanding 
was communicated at the Systems Requirement  
Review in 2007 with the initial delivery of the ECLS 
Subsystem Design and Data Handbook. 
TECHNOLOGIES 
The Orion requirements envelope a technology trade 
space. The ECLS design team’s goal is to meet or 
exceed the requirements within the limits of schedule 
and cost. To accomplish this task, the ECLS design 
team uses past experience and lessons learned from the 
design and operation of ECLS on Apollo, Space Shuttle, 
and ISS. 
When considering the operation of past and future space 
vehicles, technologies fall into broader categories than 
the seven functional categories (see Table 1). The 
categories of air, water, food, and thermal control 
represent the essentials to support human life. Waste 
management and fire safety are needed to maintain a 
safe environment. Technologies also rely on vehicle and 
environmental interfaces to meet requirements or to 
provide a lower mass solution for those environments, 
such as the vacuum resource on ISS. 
Table 1. Orion Technologies by ECLS Category 
Category Function Technology 
Air Atmosphere 
revitalization. 
Pressure control 
Solid amine bed and 
activated carbon 
filter 
O2 and N2 tanks with 
total pressure and 
oxygen sensors 
Fire Safety Fire prevention      
Fire detection 
and suppression  
Fire protection 
-  
Smoke detectors and 
a Halon system 
Handheld 
extinguisher 
Food Food provision Prepackaged food 
(by Crew 
Subsystem) 
Thermal 
Control 
Active thermal 
control 
 
 
Passive thermal 
control 
Heat exchangers, 
cold plates, radiator, 
sublimator, R134a 
evaporator, and 
phase change 
material (PCM) 
Heaters, coatings, 
and insulation (by 
Passive Thermal 
Control Subsystem) 
Waste Waste 
management 
Toilet with fecal 
collection and urine 
venting 
Water Water 
management 
Water tank with 
rubber bladders 
Category Function Technology 
Interfaces Vacuum services 
from external 
environment 
Structure with 
minimal leakage 
Flight Suits 
(EVA) 
Sublimator, urine, 
and solid amine bed 
vents  
Pressure sensor  
. 
Atmospheric control 
and suit cooling 
 
In Table 1, the general categories are linked to the Orion 
technologies from the seven functional categories. For 
example, ARS and PCS are in the Air category, and 
Flight Suit Interface is in the Interfaces category. The 
baseline technologies for Orion are described in the 
following list and shown in Figures 2 and 3, which show 
the CM and SM, respectively.  
ARS – A pressure swing assembly with solid amine 
adsorbs water and carbon dioxide (Eckart 184 / 08ICES-
0075) from the crew in the cabin or flight suits and 
desorbs the bed through a vent. A activated carbon filter 
with acid impregnation provides trace contaminant 
control, and a sensor monitors the trace contaminants in 
the carbin or flight suits. Forced convection through a 
non-condensing heat exchanger cools the cabin air, and 
cabin heating is provided by the metabolic heat from the 
crew.  
PCS – Oxygen and nitrogen are stored in Composite 
Overwrap Pressure Vessels (COPV). The release of 
nitrogen or oxygen from the tanks is regulated by total 
and oxygen pressure sensors. In case of a PCS failure, 
positive and negative relief valves are used to protect 
the integrity of the pressurve vessel from over or 
underpressurization, respectively. 
FDS – Automated or manual system disperses halon to 
extinguish fires. A handheld fire extinguisher provides 
supplemental fire protection. The material used in ECLS 
technologies is also selected to prevent ignition and fire 
propogation to the extent possible. 
ATCS – Propylene glycol with water is actively pumped 
through the CM and SM to remove heat from heat 
exchangers. Heat is stored by phase change material 
(PCM) or rejected by a body mounted radiator, water 
sublimator, or R134a evaporator.  
WM – A toilet captures and stores fecal matter, while 
urine is vented overboard (when allowed). 
PW – Rubber bladder tanks store water for drinking, 
washing, or sublimating. A point of use filter provides 
further water conditioning prior to use by the crew. 
FSI – When the crew is in flight suits, an umbilical 
interface panel links the flight suit to the ARS, PCS, and 
ATCS to revitalize the air and cool the crew. 
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Figure 2. ECLS Technologies in Crew Module. 
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Figure 3. ECLS Technologies in Service Module. 
As shown in Figure 2, most of the ECLS technologies 
are in the CM and are located in an ECLS bay or cabin. 
The oxygen, nitrogen and water commodities are stored 
in  the SM (see Figure 3), and the radiator are body 
mounted to the SM. Overall, these technologies 
represent the ECLS team’s low mass solution to meet 
requirements within the limits of cost and schedule. 
INTEGRATION STUDIES 
The baseline requirements define the general 
functionality and in turn the technologies for the vehicle. 
Integrating ECLS technologies into the vehicle requires 
deriving additional requirements and modifying the 
baseline design accordingly. In 2006 to 2007, the ECLS 
team refined the vehicle and ECLS interfaces in three 
studies: 
 1. An assessment of ATCS and integrated vehicle  
performance in low lunar orbit with respect to 
attitude. 
2. A study of power and thermal performance in Earth-
Lunar transit, and  
3. An unpressurized cargo study, which modified the 
ECLS to structures interface to enable a new cargo 
configuration for ISS missions. 
The following section provides more details about each 
study. 
LUNAR STUDY OF ATCS PERFORMANCE - In Low 
Lunar Orbit (LLO), ATCS uses a body mounted radiator 
and a phase change material heat exchanger (PCM HX) 
to maintain thermal control [3]. When the effective sink 
temperature for the radiator exceeds the radiator 
operating temperature at the subsolar point, the outlet 
coolant temperature from the radiator exceeds the ATCS 
set point, so the radiator alone is unable to meet 
performance requirements (see Figure 4). During this 
period,  a PCM HX lowers the coolant temperature by 
melting the PCM to store the heat. The operational 
period and mass of the PCM HX is based on the ATCS 
set point, radiator properties, and the sink temperature in 
LLO. 
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Figure 4. Radiator outlet temperature in LLO for the 
baseline attitude (solid line) and tighter attitude (dotted 
line). The baseline requires PCM to maintain the ATCS 
set point (hatched and shaded portion). With a tighter 
attitude, ATCS requires less PCM (shaded) to perform 
the same function. 
For this study, the radiator properties and ATCS set 
point are constant, so the key requirement and thus 
mass driver in LLO is the sink temperature. The sink 
temperature in LLO is a function of attitude and altitude. 
As the altitude is fixed per a NASA requirement, the sink 
temperature is only a function of attitude, so the PCM 
HX mass (see Figure 5) is only a function of attitude. 
 
Figure 5. Phase Change Material Heat Exchanger. 
(Image used with permission from Hamilton Sundstrand 
[4]) 
Given the sensitivity to attitude, ECLS worked with the 
thermal analysis group at Lockheed Martin to determine 
the impact of attitude changes and deadbands on the 
sink temperature and thus PCM HX. The attitudes 
studied were a tail to sun and a nose to nadir (moon) 
when in LLO. The tail to sun had a lower average sink 
temperature than the nose to nadir, so the team focused 
on a tail to sun orientation and the impact of attitude 
deadband on mass. By tightening the attitude deadband, 
the sink temperature and thus PCM HX mass were 
reduced (see Figure 4), but the power, Guidance 
Navigation & Control (GN&C), and propulsion teams 
were potentially impacted. 
To explore the mass impact of the attitude change, 
ECLS worked with Power, GN&C, and Propulsion 
subsystems. The power team indicated no impact from a 
tighter deadband, but GN&C and propulsion showed that 
a tighter deadband required more propellant than the 
baseline. By combining the mass curves, the teams 
computed a breakeven point between the PCM HX 
mass savings and the propellant mass increase. The 
breakeven point was less than the current baseline, so a 
substantial mass savings was available for a tighter 
deadband. The Orion team (Lockheed Martin, 
teammates, and NASA) completed the study with 
several technical reviews, and the change was 
implemented for Lunar missions to realize the mass 
savings. 
EARTH-LUNAR TRANSIT STUDY - For Apollo, the 
vehicle performed a roll while oriented broadside to sun 
in transit and used a fuel cell for power generation. The 
same attitude was selected for Orion to provide a 
balanced thermal environment for ECLS and Passive 
Thermal Control subsystems. Unlike Apollo though, 
Orion uses solar arrays for power generation, so the 
Power subsystem is also sensitive to the attitude. Upon 
further study, Power determined that the solar arrays 
were sensitive to failure cases from the baseline attitude. 
Therefore, Power initiated an attitude study with ECLS 
and PTC to study the impact of alternate attitudes on 
performance. 
The requirements for this study are given for the ECLS, 
Power, and PTC subsystems, where PTC also 
addresses the material limits of other subsystems and 
LSAM. ECLS requires a view of a cold sink temperature 
(e.g. deep space) by the radiator to reject heat but not 
too much to freeze the coolant in the body mounted 
radiator. Passive thermal control require coatings and/or 
heat (heaters or solar heaters) to stay within minimum 
and maximum material limits; e.g. above freezing for 
water or below upper limit of cryogenic tanks on LSAM. 
Power requires the solar arrays to be at or near 
perpendicular to the plane of the sun for power 
generation.  
Two attitudes under consideration are broadside to sun 
with a roll and tail to sun. For the baseline attitude, the 
solar arrays are not always pointed to the sun, so the 
solar arrays are less effective. Given the high power 
requirements in transit for LSAM, this could be a driving 
case. To increase power performance, a steady state 
attitude for Orion of tail to sun without a roll would 
increase solar array effectiveness. In a tail to sun 
orientation, the LSAM is shaded from the sun by Orion, 
which meets the requirement for a cold environment for 
the cryogenic tanks. However, the LSAM cabin, CM and 
SM are exposed to the deep space environment for the 
transit lasting multiple days. Given the long duration of 
the exposure, the modules would reach a cold steady 
state below acceptable material limits without heaters. 
Heaters require a significant amount of additional power 
to meet initial material limits and further drive solar array 
size. From the initial round of analysis, both attitudes 
have issues, but tail to sun appears to be more favorable 
to meet Constellation requirements for Orion and LSAM.  
Going forward, PTC and Power will continue to study the 
relationship between material limit, heaters and solar 
array size. The study will examine other attitudes and 
approaches to meet the minimum material limits. 
UNPRESSURIZED CARGO STUDY - For ISS missions, 
the volume for unpressurized cargo is larger than for 
Lunar missions. On Lunar missions, the cargo will be 
placed on the outside of the SM. Given the size and new 
access requirements for ISS cargo, the vehicle is 
examining new options to modify the SM interface with 
cargo. 
The primary option (and new derived requirement) is to 
place the unpressurized cargo within the SM for ISS 
missions. To enable this option, ECLS, Structures and 
Mechanism subsystems are considering two options for 
cargo deployment: a static opening or a door (see Figure 
6). 
 
Figure 6. Door concept for Unpressurized Cargo 
ECLS evaluated impact of a static cargo opening and a 
door mechanism on the ability to meet the key 
requirements of heat rejection and mass. For ISS 
missions with current heat loads and margins, nearly all 
of the SM area is needed for heat rejection. By using a 
door concept, the door could have integral radiators to 
meet thermal performance requirements. For the static 
opening, radiator area is lost, so additional water for 
water sublimation could be used as a possible solution 
to maintain thermal balance for ISS missions. 
On a vehicle level, ECLS, Structures and Mechanisms 
are all impacted. A static opening saves mass by 
removing radiator but adds sublimator water; 
aeroheating during launch of the cargo and SM would 
need to be addressed. A door provides protection from 
aeroheating and the required radiator area, but the door 
adds mass for the Mechanism, supporting Structure and 
radiator interface as well as new failure mode to the 
vehicle. 
For both options, the design would benefit by reducing 
the radiator area to three-quarters of the available area. 
Radiator area is dependent on the driving case heat 
load, so ECLS is working with the Power subsystem to 
reduce heat load for the driving case and is reexamining 
the assumptions for radiator performance. Going 
forward, ECLS is focusing on reducing radiator area to 
enable the unpressurized cargo option with no mass 
increase. 
CONCLUSION 
In September 2006, LM and teammates began work on 
Project Orion with NASA. In early 2007, the ECLS team 
successfully completed system requirements review. 
Since the review, the ECLS design team has further 
increased vehicle and subsystem fidelity to meet the 
interface requirements for other Constellation elements. 
These efforts included a refinement of the external 
IRD/ICDs to Ground Operations, Extravehicular 
Activities (EVA), Unpressurized Cargo, International 
Space Station (ISS), and LSAM (Altair). In the course of 
these interface studies, ECLS realized mass savings for 
the Lunar mission and worked to enable a new definition 
of unpressurized cargo for ISS missions. In the coming 
months, the ECLS design team is working towards 
preliminary design review (PDR) in 2008. 
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DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS 
ARS  Air Revitalization System 
ATCS Active Thermal Control System 
ECLS Environmental Control and Life Support 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
FDS  Fire Detection and Suppresion 
FSI  Flight Suit Interface 
GN&C Guidance Navigation and Control 
HX heat exchanger 
ICD Interface Control Document 
IRD Interface Requirement Definition 
ISS International Space Station 
kW kilowatt of electrical power 
kWth kilowatt of thermal energy 
LSAM Lunar Surface Access Module (Altair) 
PCM  phase change material 
PCS  Pressure control system 
PTC Passive Thermal Control 
PWMS Potable Water Management System 
WM Waste Management 
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3Abstract
• ISS represents the culmination of over two decades of unprecedented
global human endeavors to conceive, design, build and operate a
research laboratory in space.
• Uninterrupted human presence in space has been made possible by
an international fleet of space vehicles facilitating crew rotation,
delivery of science experiments and replenishment of propellants
and supplies.
• On-orbit propulsion systems on both ISS and Visiting Vehicles are
essential to the continuous operation of the ISS.
• This paper compares the ISS visiting vehicle propulsion systems by
providing an overview of key design drivers, operational considerations
and performance characteristics.
• Despite their differences in design, functionality, and purpose, all visiting
vehicles must adhere to a common set of interface requirements along with
safety and operational requirements.
• This paper addresses a wide variety of methods for satisfying these
requirements and mitigating credible hazards anticipated during the on-orbit
life of propulsion systems, as well as the seamless integration necessary for
the continued operation of the ISS.
4ISS Visiting Vehicles
Visiting Vehicles provide the ISS with its necessary 
lifeblood of cargo and consumables, including 
propellants.
• 7 sets of Visiting Vehicles to date:
• Soyuz
• Space Shuttle Orbiters
• Progress
• ATV
• HTV
• Dragon
• Future Vehicles
• Cygnus (scheduled to fly Summer 2013)
• Commercial Crew vehicles (~2017)
5ISS Visiting Vehicles
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6Soyuz
• Primary (current) crew vehicle 
flying to the ISS.
• Can provide propulsive 
control to ISS in off-nominal 
cases
• Docks autonomously using its 
own propulsion system
• Flown 34 ISS Missions
• Propellant: UDMH and NTO
• Pressurant: Helium
7Orbiter (Space Shuttle)
• Primary US crew 
vehicle until retired
• Provided propulsive 
support during mated 
missions
• Docked autonomously 
using its own 
propulsion system
• Flown 37 ISS Missions
• Propellant (OMS and 
RCS): MMH and NTO
• Pressurant: Helium
8Progress
• Primary current cargo vehicle
• Provides propellant refueling support
• Provides propulsive support, including primary ISS roll 
control capability until docking of the MLM
• Docked autonomously using its own propulsion system
• Flown 49 ISS Missions
• Propellant: UDMH and NTO
• Pressurant: Helium (CPS)
and Nitrogen(RFS)
9Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV)
• High capacity cargo vehicle
• Provides propellant resupply support
• Provides propulsive support
• Docked autonomously using its own propulsion system
• Flown 3 ISS Missions
• Propellant: MMH (PRSS), UDMH (RFS), and NTO
• Pressurant: Helium
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H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV)
• Large capacity cargo 
vehicle
• Mates to the ISS Node 
2 port via a capture 
and berthing method
• Flown 3 ISS Missions
• Propellant: MMH and 
MON3
• Pressurant: Helium
11
Dragon
• Commercially-developed 
US cargo vehicle
• Mates to the ISS Node 2 
port via a capture and 
berthing method
• Only current returnable 
cargo vehicle
• Flown 3 ISS Missions
• Propellant: MMH and 
NTO
• Pressurant: Helium
12
Cygnus
• Commercially-
developed US cargo 
vehicle
• Mates to the ISS 
Node 2 port via a 
capture and berthing 
method
• 1st ISS Mission 
scheduled for 
Summer 2013
• Propellant: 
Hydrazine and NTO
13
Future Vehicles
• Future commercial crew vehicles are under 
development under the Commercial Crew 
Integrated Capacity (CCiCAP) contract and 
Certification Product Contract (CPC).
14
ISS Visiting Vehicle Ports
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1.Crew Safety 
2. ISS safety
3. Protection of ISS lifetime
4. Protection of ISS docking and berthing 
capability
5. Visiting Vehicle safety
6. Mission success
Visiting Vehicle Priorities
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• Design and Operations driven by:
• ISS Program requirements and constraints
• International agreements
• Mission goals
• Visiting Vehicle intended purpose
• Safety of crew and ISS structure
• All Visiting Vehicles must meet:
• Safety Requirements Document (SRD)
• Interface Requirements Documents (IRDs)
• Segment Specifications
• All ISS Flight Rules
Propulsion System Requirements
17
Sample Propulsion System Design
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• Hazard Control – the use of design and 
operational measures to reduce the likelihood of 
hazardous effects
• Hazard Control includes:
• Hazard Elimination
• Damage Control
• Containment
• Isolation of potential hazards
• Failure tolerance considerations
• Incorporation of safety devices
• Crew operational procedures
• Protective clothing and equipment
Hazard Control
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• Most common propulsion system hazards:
• Collision
• Contamination
• Explosion
• Two categories of hazards:
• Catastrophic – hazard resulting in disabling or fatal 
crew injury, or loss of ISS or Orbiter
• Critical – hazard resulting in non-disabling crew 
injury, severe occupational illness, loss of a major ISS 
life-sustaining element, or damage to the Orbiter or 
ground facility
Hazard Control
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• Methods of meeting safety requirements:
• Fault tolerance (preferred and sometimes mandated)
• Design for minimum risk
• Isolation
• Operational control
• Fault Tolerance:
• Catastrophic Hazards: require two fault tolerance or 
three independent inhibits
• Critical hazard: require single fault tolerance or two 
independent inhibits
Hazard Control
21
• Water Hammer/Surge Pressure
• Maximum Design Pressure (MDP)
• Highest pressure driven by maximum pressures of propulsion 
system components, maximum temperature, and transient 
temperature excursions
• Accommodates two worst case failures
• Maximum Expected Operating Pressure (MEOP)
• Maximum pressure at which system operates in nominal 
conditions.
• MDP must have sufficient margin above MEOP
• Over-Pressurization Protections
• Primary Regulator Set Point
Design Drivers for Pressure Systems
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Pressure System Parameters
23
NTO Tank Over-Pressurization Potential
24
• Flight rules:
• Developed in a joint effort by MOD, ISS engineering 
specialists, and vehicle owners
• Integrate relevant engineering constraints
• Outline procedures for nominal mission operations
• Assign responsibility and authority
• Plan a course of action for potential contingencies 
and anomalies
Integration and Operations – Flight Rules
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• 4 primary propellant quantity gauging methods
• PVT method
• Uses ideal gas law
• BTI method
• m = consumption in kg
• F = thrust in kgf
• Ton = total on-time in seconds
• Isp = specific impulse
• Pavg = the average pressure of all tanks feeding the thruster in kg/cm2
• K1 and K2 = constants derived from the acceptance test data for each 
type of thruster
• Radio frequency method
• Physical measuring device utilizing properties of diaphragm tanks
Propellant Quantity Gauging
m = F * Ton/Isp
F = (K1 * Pavg) + K2
PV = nRT
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Integration and Operations
• System priming
• Flight in regulated vs blowdown mode
• Thruster failure detection and reaction
• Docking vs Capture and Berthing
• Thruster inhibits during docked or berthed phase
• Propulsive support – attitude control and translation
• Russian Control
• USTO
• Loads and structural concerns
• Propellant resupply
• ISS atmosphere contamination
• Abort capability
27
ISS Propulsive Support
• Commanded by Service Module computers
• 2 modes:
• Russian Segment Motion Control System (RS MCS)
• US – Thrusters Only (USTO)
• Roll Attitude Control
• Service Module
• Progress at DC-1 Nadir or MRM2 Zenith
• MLM (scheduled for launch in Dec 2013)
• Pitch/Yaw Attitude Control
• Service Module
• Progress at SM-Aft
• ATV at SM-Aft
28
ISS Propulsive Support
• Significant portion of ISS thruster control is 
dedicated to translational control (mostly 
reboosts)
• Translational control
• Progress R&D thrusters at SM-Aft
• ATV thrusters (OCS or ACS) at SM-Aft
• SM Main Engines
• Progress Mid-Ring thrusters at DC-1 Nadir
(∆V ≤ 0.7 m/s only)
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ISS Mean Altitude vs. Accumulated ΔV
30
ISS Altitude vs. Yearly Propellant Consumption
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ISS Refueling Support
• ISS Total On-Orbit Propellant Capacity = 7460 kg
• Maximum Propellant Capacity of FGB = 6600 kg
• Maximum Propellant Capacity of SM = 860 kg
• Total Propellant consumed over ISS Program:
nearly 80,000 kg
• Propellant provided by Visiting Vehicles:
~75,000 kg
32
ISS Propellant Load vs. Yearly Prop Consumption
33
ISS Accumulated Propellant Consumption
34
ISS Contamination
• General crew or atmosphere contamination 
risks are relatively minor except during EVAs
• EVA contamination risks:
• Fuel and Oxidizer Reaction Product (FORP)
• Gross propellant leakage
• Contamination deposited on a spacesuit
• Protections in place:
• Procedures to wipe down suits during EVA
• Procedures to clean suits after EVA
• Procedure to eliminate contamination in airlock
• Keep Out Zones (KOZ) in vicinity of thrusters
• Vehicles must show maximum undetectable propellant leakage 
is < 150 grams/hour
• Thruster inhibits request for crew to enter KOZ
• Some workarounds available if minimum # of inhibits is not 
possible
35
Abort Capability
• Abort capability necessary to protect against 
propulsion system failure or malfunction:
• Unsafe trajectory
• Loss of pressurization during regulated mode
• Thrusters failures
• Delay in departure burn
• Etc.
36
• Visiting Vehicles are necessary for continued operation of the ISS.
• Each Visiting Vehicle is able to meet all the ISS safety and  mission 
requirements through their unique vehicle design.
• Sufficient margins are built into their design to account for worst-
case on-orbit conditions. 
• VVs have provided the bulk of the total ISS propellant consumed since 
the FGB was launched in 1998 with a total of ~70,000 kg
• Using the requirements laid out in the SRD, IRD, and the flight rules, 
the ISS Program has successfully docked or berthed visiting vehicles 
over one hundred and twenty times throughout the fourteen years of its 
life.
• United effort on part of all international and commercial partners in 
design and operation of visiting vehicles is vital to the continued 
operation of the ISS.
Conclusion
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